INTRODUCTION
Strategic management is fundamentally concerned with environmental changes and organizational adaptations (Ansoff, 1979; Hofer and Schendel, 1978) . One of the key ways firms adapt their strategy is through imitation or mimetic isomorphism. The profound influence of imitation on industry dynamics has been well established (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Haveman, 1993; Miner and Raghavan, 1999; Rivkin, 2000) . It consists of following a leader (or referent; Fiegenbaum, Hart, and Schendel, 1996) , though the question of which leader to follow has not been satisfactory answered. Industrial organization (IO) economics suggests that firms should imitate the strategy of the firm that leads the overall industry in terms of its performance.
Strategic group theory recognizes mobility barriers between groups and thus suggests that firms should follow the strategy of a leading firm in their strategic group. In contrast, the resource-1.
based theory posits that a firm should imitate the leading firm from among those with similar resources (i.e., its resource group), but only if it does not have unique resources to distinguish itself from competitors. Considering these three distinctive recommendations, we seek to answer the following question: Is there a robust imitation strategy for firms seeking to improve their performance? By robust, we mean a strategy that most often leads to leadership across various environmental conditions. If the answer to this question is not a clear yes (as our findings indicate), is there a most robust strategy for each of a variety of environmental conditions? To answer these questions, we adopt a simulation methodology (Davis, Eisenhardt, and Bingham, 2007; Harrison, Lin, Carroll, and Carley, 2007) to determine the performance implications of following the industry leader, a strategic group leader, or a resource group leader. Through these simulations, we can identify the most robust imitation strategy for a firm to follow, which results in it becoming a performance leader, given a certain level of uncertainty in its external environment (environmental turbulence) and uncertainty about the value and inimitability of its resources.
Furthermore, we develop a resource-strategy-performance (R-S-P) framework to model both the magnitude and the direction of change in the strategy of an imitating firm. Our framework while similar to the one proposed by Kunc and Morecroft's (2010) contends that the relationship between resource development and performance is mediated by a firm's strategic positioning in the industry environment. Kunc and Morecroft laid out a decision making process describing the relationship between firm performance, resource conceptualization, and resource development. The inclusion of strategy positioning helps us to account for various environmental 2. conditions 1 . In our simulation, the R-S-P framework helps reveal the effect of pursuing alternative imitation strategies. That is, with a model based on this framework, we can compute a firm's performance as a function of its position and the density of competition it faces in the strategy space. An imitating firm's strategy change moves in the direction of a referent, and its extent is a function of its change capability (which in turn is a function of its resource stock at the time of the change). To complete the cycle, a firm's resources increase or decrease as a function of its past performance. Thus we can answer the question of which referent to follow by varying the parameters of the model to simulate different environmental conditions and then comparing the resulting performance under the three different imitation strategies. We contribute to extant literature by (1) developing a broad, rich model of industry dynamics that brings together literature from IO economics, strategic groups, learning, and resource-based theories; (2) identifying robust imitation strategies; and (3) recommending managerial guidelines for imitative behavior in varying industry conditions.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Competitive imitation lies at the core of strategy theory. 2 Both Schumpeter (1950) and Nelson and Winter (1982) note the central roles of innovation and imitation in dynamic competition. Ghemawat (1999: 84) defines imitation as "the diffusion of successful business models-defined 1 IDC a major strategy consulting firm provides several examples of what they term as MarketScapes. Each MarketScape represents vendors (participants) in an industry. What is fascinating is that they collapse several measures of strategy onto a Strategies dimension and several measures of capabilities onto a Capabilities dimension. Each vendor is represented as a circle on these dimensions with its center representing their respective Strategies and Capabilities scores and its size its market share. Remarkably, in the examples provided on the IDC website, shares of vendors along the diagonal are in general higher than those located off-diagonal, thus anecdotally confirming the relationship between performance and the match between strategies and resources. Further, both from the MarketScape diagrams and the associated write-up, it is clear that each market is segmented thus justifying the need to model strategy and resource groups.
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in terms of resources, deployed and/or activities performed-across the population of firms."
Other scholarly works emphasize the use and value of imitation as a strategy, such as DiMaggio and Powell (1983) , Porter (1985) , Haveman (1993 ), Rivkin, (2000 , and Lieberman and Asaba (2006) (see Miner and Raghavan, 1999 , for a review). Ghemawat (1986) provides evidence of the pervasiveness of imitation across cross-sections of industries, which likely stems from the cost and information advantages it offers (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) . In general, innovators tend to bear higher costs (e.g., Porter, 1985) and face more uncertain environments than imitators (e.g., Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988 Imagine a hypothetical choice between imitating GE's strategic scope versus that of Rolls Royce.
In the context of such broad strategic moves, both uncertainty and ambiguity increase-a condition that creates powerful drivers of imitation (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) , and managers tend to use role models and examples (Denrell, 2003; Gavetti, Levinthal, and Rivkin, 2005) . Also in these conditions, imitating the wrong firm may have serious negative consequences (Denrell, 2005; . So, the question of whom to imitate is of great importance.
Prior literature provides a wealth of responses: The best firm to imitated is variously identified as the best performer (Ghemawat, 1999; Rivkin, 2000) ; a representative of the herd 4. (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1998; Lieberman and Asaba, 2006) ; the one with the best routines for the market conditions (Nelson and Winter, 1982) ; the one perceived to be more legitimate or successful (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Lieberman and Asaba, 2006) ; a betterperforming rival (Haunschild and Miner, 1997; Miner and Raghavan, 1999; Zott, 2003) ; the one with successful strategies (Porter, 1985) ; or the most innovative firms or first movers (Schumpeter, 1950) . Thus, even when imitation is recognized as a core element of strategy practice and theory, vast possibilities for selecting a role model or referent exist, and the issue of whom to imitate remains problematic. As Haveman (1993: 596) observes, "Although imitation has long been recognized as a sensible guide to organizational change … there has been little theoretical analysis to determine which social actors will be imitated," and we might add, little theoretical analysis to determine which social actors should be imitated.
To begin to address this gap, we note that the list of possible referents begs a question about the reference group that produces the referent. For example, IO theory stipulates that in less turbulent environments, firms should imitate their industry leader, such that the industry itself is the reference group (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Ghemawat, 1986) . Strategic group theorists instead argue that imitating the industry leader does not lead to higher performance, so firms should follow the leader of their strategic group (e.g., Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1995) .
From a resource-based viewpoint, firms should differentiate themselves from others (Barney, 1991) , though if they do not possess distinctive capabilities, they should follow leading firms with comparable resources (Mehra and Floyd, 1998) , which implies the reference group is the set of firms with similar resources (Mehra, 1994 ) (i.e., their resource group). In summary, three streams of literature provide conflicting recommendations about whom to imitate-with little guidance about varying conditions. Our proposed stylized model (the R-S-P model) therefore captures elements of all three streams of research to shed more light on this question.
5.

THE R-S-P MODEL
Because our objective is to compare alternative referents (i.e., resource-based, strategy-based, or industry-based) that a firm might imitate, our model must allow for representations of the firm's resources and strategy, as well as of their dynamic relationships with performance as the firm adapts through its imitation. Therefore, our model, building on Kunc and Morecroft's (2010) framework, comprises the following relationships: (1) performance as a function of resources and strategy, (2) change in strategy as a function of the position of the referent, (3) the extent of strategy change as a function of a firm's resource position, and (4) resource change as a function of dynamic capabilities and performance.
Representation of strategy and resource
Early strategy literature (Ansoff, 1979; Hofer and Schendel, 1978) explained firm performance on the basis of either a firm's strategy position or resource endowments. The two factors are interrelated; it would not be possible to enact strategy without resources, nor would it be possible to acquire additional resources without enacting strategy. However, in strategy literature, these two spaces traditionally have been separated (Wernerfelt, 1984) . To be consistent, as well as to distinctly and clearly model and observe the underlying dynamic interaction among resources, strategy, and performance, we separate them in our model as well.
Competitive firms thus appear positioned in two multidimensional spaces. In the strategy space, firms are identified on the basis of their strategy, whereas in the resource space, the same firms are identified on the basis of their resources (Furrer et al., 2008) . Multiple dimensions can define the strategy space, as noted by McGee and Thomas (1986) and Thomas and Venkatraman (1988) . Early studies used strategy variables to conceptualize strategic groups; more recent works group firms according to their resource positions (Bogner, Thomas, and McGee, 1996; Mehra, 1996) . Tang and Liou (2010) propose the use of Bayesian inference to identify industry specific 6.
resource configurations, which mediate sources of competitive advantage and sustainable superior performance. These resource configurations correspond to the dimensions of the resource space. A similar inference process can be used to identify the dimensions of the strategy space. It could also be used to update priors on the state of the industry. Tang and Liou (2010) identify three key resource configurations or resource space dimensions in the semiconductor industry: relationship advantage, management ability, and knowledge management. Similarly, the strategy space dimensions might for example entail operating efficiency and capital leverage.
Both operating efficiency and capital leverage are derived from scale, scope, and synergy and thus relate back to the conventionally defined view of corporate strategic choices (Ansoff, 1979) .
A model of firm performance
Modeling performance as a function of the firm's strategic position is a well-established tradition.
For example, Levinthal (1997) , Ghemawat (1999) , and represent a strategyperformance map as a high-dimensional performance landscape, such that locations in strategy space relate directly to performance. In addition, following Rivkin (2000) , we model a firm's performance as a function of the distance between its actual position in the strategy space and the optimal position (which depends on the nature of the industry). In competitive environments, a firm's performance is not based solely on its own strategy (Porter, 1985) ; rather, as population ecology literature (Hannan and Freeman, 1977) and positioning literature (Hotelling, 1929; Porter, 1985) indicate, we assume that when firms are closer to each other, their respective performance suffers. Thus, we model firm performance as directly proportional with its closeness to the optimum (Rivkin, 2000) and inversely proportional with the closeness of other firms to that optimum (Kuehn and Day, 1962; Srinivasan, 1974, Sudharshan, May, and Shocker, 1987) .
However, the number and location of such optima is not clearly defined. According to 7.
strategic groups literature (e.g., Hatten and Schendel, 1977) , an industry has several optimal points, one for each group. The appropriate grouping of firms to explain their performance might reflect the commonality of their strategies (McGee and Thomas, 1986) or the commonality of their resources (Mehra 1994) . If performance is based on strategic groups, the number of optima equals the number of strategic groups present, with one optimum for each group. Similarly, if performance is based on resource groups, the number of optima is the number of resource groups present, with one optimum for each group. But IO theory (Scherer and Ross, 1990 ) instead calls for one unique, optimal position, or industry optimum, such that proximity to it leads to superior performance in the industry.
More formally, firm f's performance P f can be specified as in Equation 1, where the numerator is the inverse of the weighted (w) distance between the firm's position in strategy space (s) and the relevant optimum (opt), and the denominator is the sum of the inverses of the distances of all firms from the appropriate optimum. This follows the tradition in the marketing literature of following the pioneering work of Kuehn and Day (1962) and Shocker and Srinivasan (1974) . We provide a detailed summary of the notation in Table 1 .
(1)
Change in strategy
Assuming that managers are organizationally rational, they select and implement strategies that they believe will lead to higher performance (Simon, 1976) . Strategy change then represents an outcome jointly determined by the motivation to change, opportunity to change, and capability to change (Greve, 1998; Miller and Chen, 1994) . A firm's strategy change is not fixed in magnitude or direction over time; rather the magnitudes and directions likely vary at different times 8. (Burgelman, 1994; Zajac, Kraatz, and Bresser, 2000) . Cognitive strategic group theory (Porac et al., 1995; Reger and Huff, 1993) and reference-point theory (Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1995; Fiegenbaum et al., 1996) suggest that managers use referents to evaluate their relative strategic position and the direction to move to improve their performance. Observing competitors provides firms with an opportunity to see how similar firms, often endowed with comparable resources, go about addressing opportunities and problems that are similar to those that they face (Peteraf and Shanley, 1997 ).
In our model, a firm adjusts its strategy in accordance with observed industry behavior and a reference point. Each adjustment requires a choice of both the direction and the magnitude of change. To achieve or protect its desired position in strategy space, a firm needs to deploy resources (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Peteraf, 1993) ; thus resources constrain the change that can be made to the strategy. In turn, we model strategy change as it occurs in the multidimensional strategy space, in each time period, in the direction of a referent, and with a maximum magnitude, given available resources and not exceeding the amount needed to close the gap with the referent. We present the formal relationships of strategy change, resources, and performance gaps after we detail how resources constrain strategy change.
Resource constraints on strategy change
To achieve its desired position in strategy space, a firm must deploy resources. Many of the enablers of and constraints on strategy changes arise from meta-or dynamic capabilities (Collis, 1994; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997) and core rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992) . To modify its strategy, a firm needs to reconfigure its resource structure (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) and develop or acquire new resources (Makadok, 2001) .
At any given time, a firm's ability to change a strategy dimension is limited by its resources and dynamic capabilities. Following the principle of Occam's Razor, we model this assertion 9.
with a multiplicative conversion factor that translates resources into strategy change. In principle, conversion factors depend on a firm's dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 1997) . It is also possible that firms are idiosyncratic in choosing how much of their resources they wish to spend on the various dimensions of strategy, as captured through a multiplicative maximum utilization factor.
More formally, we specify the change in firm f's strategy (∆s) on dimension j in Equation 2, which provides the maximum change possible, and Equations 3 and 4, which reveal the constraints that limit this change. Associated with each resource group k is a factor w k,i,j that scales the resource value of firm f on resource dimension i to change on strategy dimension j without further constraints. Utilization factor util k,i,j constrains the amount of change possible through the use of resource dimension i on resource dimension j.
Furthermore, to ensure that a firm's actual change (∆s actual,f,i ) is no more than needed to attain best performance (Simon, 1976) , we apply the following additional condition:
where ∆s f,i is the difference between the optimal strategy and the f th firm's strategy.
Resource changes
Resources may change through utilization, erosion, or substitution (Collis, 1994; Makadok, 2001; Sirmon, Hitt, and Ireland, 2007) , so a firm must continually develop its resources (Kunc and Morecroft, 2010) and as resources get used, it needs to replenish its stocks by reinvesting part of its performance in resources (Dierickx and Cool, 1989) . The extent of resource change affected by the use of a unit of performance depends on the firm's dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 1997) and resource configuration (Tang and Liou, 2010) . In each time period, the firm's resources get updated, with the subtraction of the extent to which they were used in the past 10.
(erosion is not explicitly modeled) and the addition of a proportionality factor of performance.
Therefore, the governing equation for the conversion of resource i into strategy, accounting for the actual use of resources, is:
where q f,i is a measure of how much of resource i is used.
Not all available resources necessarily are used to implement strategy change (Tang and Liou, 2010) ; the amount of change needed may have been less than the amount of change possible with the resources available (Penrose, 1959) . A ratio of needed strategy change to the maximum possible strategy change provides an indicator of the proportion of usable resources actually used.
Recalling that ∆s f,i is the difference between the optimal strategy and the f th firms' strategy, and ∆s max,f,i is the maximum possible change allowed, we denote
which implies that Σ j util r,i,j ≤ 1; otherwise, firms will use more resources than they actually have, which is not a valid condition.
We performed a simulation study using these relationships. For the simulation, the model based on the R-S-P framework was programmed in C++. When possible, we set parameters suggested by prior literature (Repenning, 2002) or empirical evidence (Oliva and Sterman, 2001 ).
For other parameters that rely on scale values that are likely specific to industries, we instead carried out a sensitivity analysis to find a range of values that produces useful scenarios as recommended by Davis, Eisenhardt and Bingham (2007) . Sudharshan, May and Shocker (1987) also provide insights into parameter selection for simulations representing spatial competition.
With a generic set of scales, we could assume that an appropriate scale transformation is possible 11.
between the generic scale values we use and the empirically derived values that can be measured.
For example, without loss of generality, interval scales are invariant up to a + bx (where x is the variable, and a and b are transformational parameters); ratio scales are invariant up to an ax rescaling. With these scale invariance conditions, our results become generalizable.
MODEL PARAMETERIZATION
To study the effects of resources and strategy on a firm's performance and the robustness of its imitation strategies, we first ran a parametric study to identify acceptable ranges for different parameters (Davis, Eisenhardt, and Bingham, 2007; Law and Kelton, 2000) . We sought to identify the primary effects of the group parameter on performance, its variance among different firms, and the number of time-steps required to reach a steady state. Then, we examined the effect of perturbations of the optimal point on the dynamics of the industry. Given the nature of the adaptation model, there is a chance that some parameter values will result in cases in which the performance of all firms is very close, such that they nearly converge. If this convergence were to occur in just a few time periods, it would imply that the parameter values used are not very interesting, in that they would not correspond with the reality in most competitive markets that show sustained performance differences across firms (Schmalensee, 1985) . Therefore we carefully chose the parameter values, as we describe in detail subsequently. We also determined acceptable ranges for the parameters to use in our main simulation study. A firm in a resource group is characterized by two parameters: (1) p_r k,i , which converts the performance of a firm belonging to resource group k into resource on the i th dimension of resource space, and (2) r_s k,i,j , which converts the resource on the i th dimension of the resource space of a firm belonging to resource group r into the strategy on the j th dimension of strategy 12.
space. A third parameter to parameterize is util k,i,j , which is the maximum proportion of resources that can be converted into strategy. Firms are allocated to strategic groups on the basis of the closeness of their initial positions in strategy space, so strategic groups have no specific parameters.
In turn, p_r k,i provides the principal feedback to the system by governing the replenishment of the firm's resources. It describes the amount of resources a firm obtains per unit of performance.
We made this parameter non-dimensional by dividing it by the order of magnitude of the resources. To facilitate the comparison of the effects of p_r k,i across different simulations, when varying the range of resources, we normalized it as follows: p_r' k,i = p_r k,i /r max,i . In the simulations, r max,i is taken to be 10 (i.e., the maximum of the magnitude used for simulation), without loss of generality. It is important to identify an acceptable range for p_r' k,i because a higher value of p_r' k,i ensures that firms do not exhaust their resources too quickly.
A high value of the normalized performance-to-resource feedback parameter (p_r) ensures that firms do not exhaust their resources too quickly. For the same unit of performance, more resources are created for higher normalized performance-to-resource feedback parameter firms.
With higher resources, the tendency of each firm is to adopt the currently targeted optimal strategy in fewer time steps, which leads it to miss out on (overshoot) nearby optimal strategy points that may be better. In other words, there is less time for learning.
If all firms face similar conditions, then an optimal value of p_r' k,i exists that minimizes the disparity between the firms and the time needed to reach a steady or quasi-steady state. Because the objective for all firms is improved performance, we chose the condition in which the change in the standard deviation of firm performance was close to 0 (zero), which implies that in the industry, there may be performance differences across firms, but the overall performance variation does not change much from one time period to another. This state is the converged 13.
state, and the time taken to reach it is t_conv.
In most industries, convergence only occurs after a sufficient period of time (Miner and Raghavan, 1999) . It is therefore important to identify a range for p_r' k,i for which convergence is not achieved too quickly. The simulation results in Figure 1 show that at low values of p_r' k,i (i.e., < 0.1), there is no effect on t_conv. However at values greater than 0.1, the time taken to converge decreases with the increase in p_r' k,i . The results in Figure 2 show that a p_r' k,i value between 0.2 and 0.3 gives the lowest standard deviation of performance of firms at t_conv when firms follow their resource group or strategic group leaders. This trend changes when firms move toward the optimal points or the overall group leaders though. These results are valid when the optimal point(s) is fixed and there is no perturbation in the system-constraints that we later relax. With these results, and because r max,i has been fixed at 10, the range for p_r' k,i is between 0.1 and 0.2 (i.e., p_r k,i is between 1 and 2), to denote the range that leads to sufficient performance differences across firms for a sufficient period of time.
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 We also defined a range for util k,i,j , the maximum percentage of resources that can be 14.
converted into strategy. For the sake of simplification, we set the util k,i,j matrix to be symmetric with the off-diagonal terms equal to 0 (in line with Suh's [1990] design axiom). Thus the resource coordinate i serves to change only the strategy coordinates i.
The simulation results in Figure 3 show the effect of util i,i on t_conv. A higher value of util i,i reduces the time taken to converge only when firms try to adopt a strategy of directly targeting the optimal point (s_cond = 1). For all the other strategies, the time taken to converge reduces up to a util i,i of about 0.4. Figure 4 shows the effect of util i,i on the standard deviation of performance at t_conv. When firms adopt the strategy of targeting the optimal point (s_cond = 1), the standard deviation of performance at t_conv is nearly constant and is not affected by the util i,i . For the other strategies, no effect can be observed.
[Insert Figures 3 and 4 about here]
From these results and to meet our criteria of sufficient interfirm performance difference over a sufficient period of time, we fixed the range for util i,i between 0.2 and 0.5 and the range for r_s k,i,j between 0.2 and 0.75.
Effect of optimal point perturbations
Finally, we tested the effect of optimal point perturbations. Previously, optimal points have been assumed to be fixed across time, but environments are often dynamic (Sirmon et al., 2007) , so we relax this constraint and rerun the simulations with random perturbations added to the optimal point(s) at every time period. Even the smallest perturbations ensure that no steady state is possible and that no single firm can remain a leader forever, as the number of leadership changes in Figure 5 show. The perturbations depicted in the figure were randomly chosen, and the maximum amplitude allowed is a percentage of s max,j . When the perturbation is greater than 2 percent, the system becomes chaotic. In such a situation with ample perturbations in the position of the optimal point(s), there is a large number of changes in leadership and firm performance, 15.
leading the imitation of a prior leader to lead to unpredictable outcomes. Thus, in the main simulation, we set the value of the perturbation parameter at 1 percent to provide sufficient but not excessive variation (Law and Kelton, 1991) .
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
This parameterization study also helps establish the face validity of this study, in that our system behaved as would be expected.
SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSES
Which imitation strategy is the most robust? As we define it, it is the one that most often leads to leadership across various environments (i.e., environmental turbulence and perturbation in the position of the optimum and uncertainty about the value and inimitability of its resources).
Should firms follow their resource group or strategic group leaders? Or, should they follow the industry's overall best performer? To answer these questions, we ran a series of simulations in which different imitation strategies (s_cond) were adopted by firms from different groups. The simulations used the following parameter values and ranges: total firms = 30; number of resource groups = 10; number of strategy groups = 15 3 (we ensured the number of resource groups was different from the number of strategy groups to facilitate the investigation of the effects of grouping by resource versus strategy). These values are consistent with the findings of previous studies on strategic and resource groups, which suggest 4 to 6 groups in industries with between 12 and 43 firms (Bogner et al., 1996; Cool and Schendel. 1987, 1988; Fiegenbaum et al., 1990; 3 There is considerable debate about the most appropriate clustering methodology and how to specify cluster cut-offs for each methodology; this is about the number of strategic group and firms change membership over time (e.g., Bogner et al., 1996; Cool and Dierickx, 1993) . To avoid adding more complications, in terms of changing clustering methodologies and the number of groups over time, we focused specifically on the effect of the imitation strategy chosen.
16. Hatten and Schendel, 1977; Mehra. 1996) Table 1 .
[Insert Table 1 about here]
In Tables 2 and 3 , we present the results when the optimal points are fixed. Table 2 shows the results when firms belonging to the same resource group follow the same strategy: Firms in resource group 1 follow their resource group leader, firms in resource group 2 follow their strategic group leader, and firms in resource group 3 follow the industry overall leader. Table 3 presents the results when firms belonging to the same strategic group have the same strategy:
Firms in strategy group 1 follow their resource group leader, firms in strategy group 2 follow their strategic group leader, and firms in resource groups 3 and 4 follow the industry overall leader. The next two tables present the results when the optimal point is perturbed with a maximum amplitude of 1 percent. Table 4 refers to the case in which firms belonging to the same resource group follow the same strategy, and Table 5 details the results when firms belonging to the same strategic group have the same strategy.
[Insert Tables 2 to 5 about here]
The simulation results show that when there is no perturbation and the firms in a resource 17.
group have similar strategies, it is better for them to follow the industry leader if there is an optimal point for each resource group (76.7 percent chance of becoming leader) or when there is a single optimal point for the entire industry (57.9 percent chance of becoming leader). It is better to follow the strategic group leader when there is an optimal point for each strategic group though (55.9 percent chance of becoming leader). When there is no perturbation and the firms in a strategic group have similar strategies, it is better for them to follow the industry leader in any case. When the optimal point is perturbed, and firms belonging to the same resource group follow the same strategy, firms are better off following the strategic group leader when there is an optimal point for each resource group (42.8 percent chance of becoming leader) or when there is a optimal point for each strategic group (57.6 percent chance of becoming leader). Yet it is better to follow the industry overall leader when there is a single optimal point for the entire industry (66.8 percent chance of becoming leader). In a perturbed environment and when firms belonging to the same strategic group follow the same strategy, firms are better off following the industry overall leader when there is an optimal point for each resource group (54.1 percent chance of becoming leader) or when there is a single optimal point for the entire industry (75.8 percent chance of becoming leader). It is however better to follow the strategic group leader when there is an optimal point for each strategic group (59.2 percent chance of becoming leader).
In a turbulent environment, managers choose which referent to imitate using two types of information: their worldview (or mental model; Adner and Helfat, 2003; Kunc and Morecroft, 2010 ) and the observed behavior of the firms in their reference group. The strategic positioning of a firm relative to other firms and their positioning relative to the optimal point(s) for the industry dictate its performance. This process is elaborated as follows: First, managers have (or choose) a worldview. Due to internal and external causal ambiguity, managers do not a priori know the location of the optimal point (King, 2007; Kunc and Morecroft, 2010) . They infer the 18.
location of this point based on their performance and the performance of other firms (Tang and Liou, 2010) . Which firms they use as referent depends on their worldview, which is the mental representation or knowledge structure they have about the relationships between resource, strategy, and performance. This mental representation includes the reference group with which they identify (Figenbaum, Hart, and Schendel, 1996) . According to prior literature, managers may adopt one of four different worldviews: (1) their strategic group, (2) their resource group, (3) their industry as a whole, or (4) a flexible worldview, which allows them to identify each reference group and choose the most relevant one based on the situation. Second, managers need to observe the behavior of the firms in their reference group, and the result of these observations is conditioned by their worldview. Managers with a worldview based on resource groups can observe if firms in the same resource group follow the same imitation strategy. However, if firms in the same strategic group follow the same imitation strategy, for example, managers will not be able to observe or identify any pattern of behavior. Only managers with flexible worldviews can recognize all the different patterns of behavior and choose the correct referent for imitation.
Third, after conducting their worldview-shaped observations and analysis, managers choose the leader to imitate: resource group or industry leader if they have a resource group worldview, strategic group or industry leader if they have a strategic group worldview, industry leaders when the managers have an industry worldview, and any of the three leaders when they adopt a flexible worldview. A firm's performance (i.e., the likelihood that the firm will become an industry leader) then is a function of the manager's strategic choice and the strategic choices of all competitors, together with the location of the optimal point(s). An industry might feature an optimal point for each resource group, for each strategic group, or only one optimal point for the entire industry. Figure 6 depicts the firm's decision tree, as well as the resulting likelihoods of becoming an industry leader according to the results in Tables 4 and 5. From this stylized 19.
decision process, we derive seven key findings pertaining to our simulation results.
[Insert Figure 6 about here]
Finding 1: Knowledge of the state of the industry allows firms to choose the best strategy.
We fine large differences in the percentage of chances of becoming the industry leader across states of the industry, ranging from 0 to 33.3 percent. Firms that are able to identify (know) the state of an industry have higher likelihood of becoming an industry leader than those that do not know it.
Finding 2: When the state of the industry is known and the industry is homogeneous (i.e., there is a single optimum for the entire industry), firms should follow the industry leader.
When there is only one optimum for the entire industry, following the leader is always the best strategy. On average, there is a 12.2 percent likelihood of becoming the industry leader, whereas the likelihood is only 5.0 percent when choosing another strategy (p = 0.03).
Finding 3: When the state of the industry is known to be fragmented into strategy groups
such that each strategy group has an optimal point, firms should follow their strategic group leader.
When the state of the industry is known and the industry is fragmented, with an optimal point for each strategy group, there is an 18.0 percent likelihood of becoming the industry leader if the firm follows the strategic group leader, compared to 4.8 percent when choosing another strategy (p = 0.002).
Finding 4: When the state of the industry is known and it is fragmented into resource groups such that each resource group has an optimal point, firms should differentiate (i.e., not follow the same type of leaders as other firms).
20.
In this state of the industry, firms that follow the resource group leader have a 9.7 percent average likelihood of becoming industry leader; that likelihood is only 7.5 percent when they choose another strategy (p = 0.09). Because, there are vast differences in the likelihoods of becoming the industry leader across fixed and flexible worldviews, firms with a flexible worldview are able to differentiate more accurately among different strategic alternatives and thus increase their chance of becoming industry leader.
Finding 6: Firms with a fixed worldview and no knowledge about the state of the industry should follow the industry leader.
Assuming that a firm does not have knowledge about the state of the industry, which we take to be equivalent to assuming that all the states have equal probabilities, following the industry leader is the most robust strategy. There is one exception to this finding though: when managers have a strategic group worldview, they have higher chance to become industry leader by following their strategic group leader. However, in three out of four situations, when firms are able to differentiate more accurately among different strategic alternatives (because of their flexible worldview), they enjoy higher likelihoods of becoming industry leaders. Following the strategic group leader is the most robust strategy when the states of the industry have equal probabilities of occurrence. In all such situations, following the strategic group leaders 21.
produces equal or higher likelihoods of becoming the industry leader.
DISCUSSION
If firms had perfect information, they would perhaps make perfect decisions. It is only when they do not have a source of perfect information (because of the non-existence, cost, or some other reason) that they are likely to resort to inferences to adapt their strategies (Tang and Liou, 2010) .
Imitation of referents is one such coping and adaptation behavior. In this work, we have worldview. Some firms also may have a flexible worldview, such that they consider each reference group and choose the most relevant one based on the situation. This approach is in effect a fourth type of referent, namely, the flexible referent. Because information/observation may be costly or perhaps due to managerial cognitive biases, firms may choose a specific referent group's behaviors to observe and imitate. An industry might be characterized by the existence of an optimal point for each resource group, for each strategic group, or only one optimal point for the entire industry. A firm's objective, to become the leader, then is a function of the manager's strategic choice and the choices of all competitors with respect to the location of optimal point(s).
22.
Theoretical contribution
Our simulation model is consistent with work by Powell (2003; Powell and Lloyd, 2005) , who measures performance in terms of wins, equivalent to the results we present in Tables 2-5 . There are some differences though. First, we do not have local optima (rugged landscape). Second, we have moving as opposed to fixed ones. We also add model complexity in two different ways; local optima could be added easily to our model in the future. Moreover, our results are consistent with those of , who show that Analogizers are better than Local Searchers in a novel and complex landscape (environment). However, and do not provide specific guidelines for managers to identify a good referent. With this study, we propose and test the performance of three types of referents (best performer in the resource group, strategic group, or entire industry). Our results are also consistent with Denrell's (2005) emphasis on the dangers of benchmarking (i.e., following the wrong leader).
Along the same vein as the studies by Kunc and Morecroft (2010) and Tang and Liou (2010) , this paper also extends the resource-based view by arguing that the mere possession of valuable, rare, non imitable, and non substitutable resources (Barney, 1991) is not sufficient to ensure sustainable superior performance. Whereas, Tang and Liou (2010) demonstrate that is resources configurations that leads to superior performance, not single independent resources, Kunc and Morecroft (2010) argue that these resource configurations should not only be conceptualized, but should also be developed over time and implemented. Our study extends this work by showing that the conceptualization and development of resources should be contingent with environmental conditions. In addition, consistent with these study, our behavioral framework contend that managers are only boundedly rational and that in the face of causal ambiguity there is no assurance that they choose the right referent and develop the right resources and implement the 23. right strategy.
Managerial implications
As an example that might help in thinking of how our study translates into Another example may be seen in the European airline industry. Every European major airline is seeking to develop strategies for responding to competition from low-cost airlines (Jarach, 2004) . However, every initiative to imitate low-cost airlines, such as EasyJet and Ryanair, seems likely to fail due to differences in resource group memberships. For example, Air France's low cost subsidiaries are constrained to a large extent in their options by union pressures and cost structure. Following a leader of a different resource group-low cost airlines-when resource groups matter seems to be unwise.
Our results also fit a contingency theory viewpoint; the contingencies and their appropriate strategies constitute a result of our analysis. The findings from our simulations suggest several managerial recommendations, which we present in Figure 7 in the form of a 2 × 2 matrix that 24.
consists of firms' worldview (fixed or flexible) and firms' knowledge about the state of the industry (known or unknown). Thus we detail four robust imitation strategies.
[Insert Figure 7 about here]
Firms with a fixed worldview (i.e., fixed referent) and no knowledge of the state of the industry should follow the industry leader; firms with a flexible worldview (i.e., flexible referent) and no knowledge of the state of the industry should follow their strategic group leader. In addition, firms with a fixed worldview and knowledge of the state of the industry should follow the industry leader if the industry is homogenous, their strategic group leader if optimal points are based on strategic grouping, or differentiate if optimal points are based on resource grouping.
Finally, firms with a flexible worldview and knowledge of the state of the industry should follow the industry leader if the industry is homogenous, follow their strategic group leader if optimal points are based on strategic grouping, or differentiate if optimal points are based on resource grouping.
Limitations and future research
Our paper has some limitations as does any simulation study (Davis, Eisenhardt, and Bingham, 2007; Harrison, Lin, Carroll, and Carley, 2007) . In our simulations, we captured the basic dynamics of the R-S-P model in the form of the effect of the group parameters on the overall industry. Accordingly, we studied the effects of perturbations on leadership changes and overall dynamics in the industry; how the factor converting performance into resources on the outcome affected the overall leaders (the parameter played an important role, depending on the strategy condition adopted by firms); and, when different groups adopted different strategy conditions, the ideal strategy conditions that lead to overall leadership. However, the effects of non-constant parameters such as the one converting resource to strategy need further investigation. We held them constant in our simulations, both in strategy space and time. This approach could be 25.
changed to reflect changes in cost over time or a spatially varying cost. The sensitivity analysis of the effect of the other parameters on the outcomes also needs to be studied, as should the effects of inter-coupling of parameters. Future studies using behavior simulation (per Kunc and Morecroft, 2010) or Bayesian inference (per Tang and Liou, 2010) might be useful to identify values for key parameters and assess the external validity of our framework. Future simulation research could involve varying many more components of our model, including the objective function(s). A fruitful study would also allow for the Bayesian updating of the ideal point estimates (i.e., more generally response surface estimates by industry participants). Developing methodologies for estimating response surfaces from natural experiments would be very promising as these are more applicable for practice in our disciplines than in-petri experimentation. Lab (or in-petri) experiments with controlled studies would also be very helpful to understand specific learning models and strategic thinking models that might provide additional knowledge or refinements to incorporate into mathematical models of industry change.
CONCLUSION
The R-S-P model provides a basis for empirical implementation as part of a decision support system, because it details the parameters (variables) and functional forms to be calibrated (measured) for a particular industry and its constituents. We believe that empirical examinations of industries using our model will not only lead to a better understanding of industry dynamics but also encourage methodological developments for estimating the functional forms of resource to strategy conversion, strategy to performance conversion, and performance to resource conversion. Firms using the recommendations derived from our model thus could focus on innovations that might change the competitive space, as well as the relationships among resources, strategy, and performance, which would enhance their competitive advantage.
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